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Abstract 
Product Life-Cycle Management (PLM) defines the integration of different kinds of activities, from a technical, organizational and managerial 
point of view. These activities are performed by engineering staff throughout the entire life cycle of industrial products. To improve PLM, the 
information which is gained within a specific PL phase should be made available and used along the entire life cycle. This position paper 
describes how the No-fault-found (NFF) problem can benefit from transferring information from BOL into MOL. The application field of 
avionics is considered, in particular the generated information in the test process of BOL and the relevance of NFF. For this purpose, the article 
presents an approach by ARINC 672 for reducing NFF phenomenon. On basis of this approach the authors propose an extension to insert the 
information of test process’ results proactive into the ARINC 672 approach. The extension has a visionary nature and does not consider 
technical background of the BOL and MOL of aircrafts. Finally the position paper motivates the next necessary steps to bring the proposed 
extension to its applicability. 
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1. Introduction 
Product Life-Cycle Management (PLM) defines the 
integration of different kinds of activities, from a technical, 
organizational and managerial point of view. These activities 
are performed by engineering staff throughout the entire life 
cycle of industrial products. The entire life cycle includes the 
phases Beginning of-Live (BOL), Middle-of-Live (MOL) and 
End-of-Live (EOL). In the Middle of Live, a product is used, 
can be upgraded and is maintained. Furthermore, most 
products are surrounded by services which increase the quality 
of usage [1]. The effort for the above mentioned MOL 
activities correlates e.g. to the type of the products, the quality 
and the planned obsolescence. The proportion of the 
maintenance of the MOL activities correlates e.g. to the 
complexity and the duration of Life of a product.”… The 
purpose of maintenance is to extend equipment lifetime or at 
least the mean time to the next failure whose repair may be 
costly…” [2]. The role of maintenance is very relevant to the 
application field of safety-critical systems. “…Safety-critical 
systems are those systems whose failure could result in loss of 
life, significant property damage or damage to the 
environment. There are many well-known examples in 
application areas such as medical devices, aircraft flight 
control, weapons and nuclear systems…” [3] Up to now, in 
safety-critical systems occur system errors during its operation 
time. In such a case, the system is removed from service and 
sent to the maintenance. During the maintenance activities, the 
error messages which contain the fault behavior are evaluated 
to identify the responsible components. In rare cases, the 
maintenance activities can't reconstruct the failure and can’t 
find the potential defect. In such a situation, the operating 
safety will be checked and finally, it will be allowed the 
continued use. This issue is known as No Fault Fond (NFF) . 
In avionics the NFF problem is“...an age-old phenomenon that 
strangely enough has not yet been entirely successfully 
solved...” [4]. In this paper, the author demonstrates the 
relevance of NFF and counter-measures which includes the 
usage of BOL data. For this purpose, the degree of the NFF 
problem and one possible counter-measure are presented. 
Subsequently, it will be defined which information are 
contained in the BOL data regarding the functional testing. 
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The paper shows a closer look to information sources and their 
representation forms. Finally, it will be demonstrated how the 
information can be applied to reduce a NFF phenomenon.  
 
2. No Fault Found phenomenon 
The phenomenon of No Fault Found is known by a variety 
of names (e.g. No Trouble-Found (NTF) or No Defect Found 
(NDF)) and is a problem which has concerned operators and 
maintainers in all technology-dependent application fields 
which range from avionics over automotive to 
telecommunications. The central element of a NFF 
phenomenon is the intermittent occurrence of a fault. 
A fault is “…the state of an item characterized by inability 
to perform a required function, excluding the inability during 
preventive maintenance or other planned actions, or due to 
lack of external resources…” [5] A No Fault Found (NFF) 
defines the phenomenon that a fault which is detected during 
operation time can’t be reconstructed in maintenance 
activities afterwards. Reconstruction is a proceeding in which 
the faulty unit will be removed and tested under a lower level 
of maintenance. In the application field of avionics a NFF is 
defined as “…the result of testing when a unit removed as 
faulty at one level of maintenance is found to be fault free 
when tested at the next lower level of maintenance…” [6]  
 
The commonality of the above mentioned definitions is 
that a fault has occurred and cannot be “…verified, replicated 
at will, or attributed to a specific root cause…” [1]. To handle 
this kind of occurred fault, the person responsible has to 
assume a cause. Subsequently, this person responsible 
initiates the repair work on basis of the assumed cause. 
Finally, the operating safety will be checked and the system 
will be allowed the continued use.  
 
The NFF phenomenon has been relevant for more than 15 
years. In 1990 a study showed that 21-70% of the total fault 
were classified as NFF [1,7]. 10 years later, another study 
determined a rate of 50-60% of NFF reported by commercial 
airlines and military repair depots [1,8]. A more detailed 
itemisation is given in Fig. 1. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Hard failures and NFF failures on military aircraft, Source: [1] 
 
As the above mentioned frequencies show, the relevance of 
NFF is still high and resulted in different approaches to 
reduce the amount of NFF occurences. One of the major 
activities in the application field avionics led to the ARINC 
672 initiative. The objective of the initiative was to develop a 
process to reduce the impact of NFF phenomenon and 
resulted in a report. This report defines a structured process to 
identify, analyze and resolve NFF issues [4]. It was identified 
that the source of NFF is not only limited to the operation and 
its corresponding kind-of-use. Rather, it was discovered that 
the entire life cycle of an aircraft is a possible source of NFF. 
Meyer [4] summarized the NFF sources, which is shown in 
Fig. 2.  
 
 
Fig. 2. A Generic “Hierarchical System Life Cycle”, Source: [4]. 
 
Fig. 2 shows a schematic illustration of a generic 
“Hierarchical System Life Cycle”, which is oriented to the 
avionics environment. The Hierarchical System Life Cycle 
distinguishes two product life cycle phases of an aircraft, 
namely Design/Production and Operation/Support. In a space 
of a product life cycle phase, it focuses on the following four 
levels Component, System, Aircraft and Fleet. This kind of 
abstraction level defines which entity is affected in the 
corresponding phase. The Develop/Production phase has a 
significant impact on the Operation/Support phase, because it 
determines all requirements, constraints and restrictions to 
guarantee a safety operation time. A safety operation time 
means, that fault can occurs but the safety of creatures is in 
danger at any time For this purpose, the task of development 
activities is to ensure, among others, that all possible fault 
behavior can be detected, can be treated and can be classified 
how critical the fault is. These objectives are in contrast to the 
NFF phenomenon. To detect all fault behavior,  
Meyer [4] mentioned that modules for built-in testing 
(BIT), diagnosis (BITE), and troubleshooting are specified 
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and implemented in an aircraft during the Design/Production 
phase. All systems together, are the foundation to detect fault 
behavior and to gain so much information to prevent the 
occurrence of the NFF phenomenon. Furthermore, the 
modules determine the cornerstones of the operation time and 
maintenance activities afterwards. The thesis of the authors is, 
the higher the quality of the tool chain is, the less NFF cases 
should occur. Apart from the tools, the underlying process and 
the involved skilled employees of the aircraft’s life cycle have 
a direct impact of the NFF. Meyer [4] summarized the 
operation processes, service processes and the involved stake-
holders, which is presented in Fig. 3. 
 
Fig. 3. Stake-holders in the Operation/ Support Phase, Source: [4]  
 
Fig. 3 depicts the process steps regarding the interaction 
and the involved stake-holders of the operation/ support phase 
of an aircraft’s life cycle, which is shown in Fig. 2. To 
reproduce a fault/failure, all four levels of the Hierarchical 
System Life Cycle have to be considered. At each level 
another abstraction level of an airplane is focused. Therefore, 
specific documents and specific skilled employee are 
deployed. For example, the maintenance of component level 
requires e.g. as documents the repair manual and as a skilled 
employee a component tester.  
When reproducing a fault, it may happen that the fault 
behavior cannot be fully adjusted within a level. The reason 
for this is that a fault behavior can detect in one level but the 
trigger is located in one another level. Furthermore, the trigger 
and the cause can lie in different layer. In the worst case, the 
fault behavior, the trigger and the cause lies in different 
levels. To resolve such kind of failures, the interaction 
between the levels, the information sources and the involved 
stuff are necessary. The combination of all sources enables an 
efficient and complete failure search. The weakness of the 
above mentioned process lies in the fact, that failures can only 
be resolved on basis of the measured data, the maintenance 
documentation and the experience of the stuff. In cases in 
which a NFF is occurred this set of information sources is 
insufficient. In the following, an approach is presented to 
enrich the information density in the case of a possible NFF. 
It will be presented which additional information can be 




The objective of the approach is to support the skilled 
employees in cases in which a reported fault would be 
classified as a NFF. Through the supporting a higher 
information density is achieved and enables a deeper 
comprehension off possible failure sources and corresponding 
failure chains. For this purpose, the strict division of the 
Design/Production phase and the Operation/Support phase of 
the above mentioned Hierarchical System Life Cycle should 
be softened. This article supports the hypothesis that 
knowledge from BOL can enrich the comprehension for 
the system/components for maintenance activities.  
 
Fig. 4. Extended version of the Hierarchical System Life Cycle [4] 
 
In Fig. 4 the approach is shown how the Hierachical 
System Life Cycle can be extended to satisfy the above 
mentioned objective. During the Design of an aircraft which 
includes a developing and a testing phase, a set of documents 
are created. The documents’ range spans from requirements, 
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over drawing to formal models. Accordingly to the high 
diversity, the representation form varies from informal to
formal. The criterion representation form has a significant
impact on the suitability for the usage in the 
Operation/Support phase due to the access and interpretation
of the information in an automated way. These documents 
describe in their entirety the product-specific and general
assessments and the specific properties of the implementation
of the developed system. The test process which is a part of 
the Design/Production phase has to satisfy the DO-178B in
the application field of avionics. This standard postulates that 
aircrafts are tested against the criterion MCDC [9] in the field 
of safety critical systems. That means that the following
common criteria of the System under Test (SuT) must be 
tested: All-States, All-Transitions, Modified
Condition/Decision Coverage (MCDC) [10]. The criterion All 
States defines that all possible states which a SuT can accept 
has to be considered during the testing. This characteristic
feature of testing results in a detailed and complete view of 
the SuT and it reflects the information density of the test
relevant documents. To resolve a presumably NFF 
phenomenon, the test relevant documents could be used to
enrich the information density for the maintenance activities.
This promising approach is presented in the following. .
3.1 Test relevant documents
Hierarchical System Life Cycle (see Fig. 2) addresses a test
process with the three levels (Component, System and
Aircraft) of the Develop/Production phase. Nowadays, many
companies develop their products according to the V-model, 
which is shown in Fig. 5.
Fig.5. The V-model of the Systems Engineering Process [11]
Fig. 5 describes the development process of a system. It is 
divided into two main phases, the development activities on 
the left side and the test process on the right side of the V-
model. The objective of a test process is to “…take the 
responsibility for the functionality, reliability and operational 
safety of their products. …” [12]. To satisfy this strict 
requirements, there are two strategies available: proof of the 
correctness or a verification on basis of successful executed
test cases. Up to now, “…the proof of the correctness of these 
functions cannot be realized in a formal, analytical way…”
[12]. That means that the test process is realized with the aid
of test cases. This premise leads to a test process in which the
main tasks are e.g. the identifying of parameters, the
identifying of value ranges and the modeling of the behavior 
and finally a reduction to a relevant subset. This relevant
subset will be completed to a set of test cases and used to
verify a SuT against its requirements. Therefore, a test case
aims to provoke an error condition and subsequently, check
whether the system behaves according to the requirements.
This kind of information contained in the test process (e.g. as 
test models) provides the deepest understanding of the system 
and in conclusion is the best information source for resolve a
probably NFF phenomenon. In the following it is presented 
how such kinds of information can be represented in test
models and how the information can be applied.
Within a test process two types of information can be
explored over the SuT, namely structural property and
behavior. Structural property describes the fixed structures of
the SuT. It belongs to e.g. which components are installed,
which properties have the components, in what range the 
components receive or send information. Test engineers can
model such types of information in different representations
forms which comprise a corresponding degree of formal. In 
relation to the intended usage, a more formal representation 
form enables an automatic access and an automatic 
interpretation of data for possible search request. A common
method accepted by industry is to model the structural
information regarding relevant parameters and relevant value 
ranges is the Classification Tree Method (CTM) [13]. The 
objective of the CTM is to identify the relevant parameters 
and corresponding values for a test. A test can address a SuT 
function and satisfies the correct behavior on critical system 
states. In the application field of avionics, for example, an
asymmetry of both wings position is a critical state. An
example of a classification tree is given in Fig. 6.
Fig. 6. Example of a classification tree [12]
Fig. 6 gives an example of the classification tree how
relevant parameters and values can be modeled. The grey
nodes represent the values which are considered during the
development of test cases. Each of the values is an and
contains a set of values. The assumption is that for each value
of an equivalence class it provokes the same SuT behavior 
and can so be summarized in accordance with a value. The 
information which parameter and which equivalence classes 
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are relevant is very important information for resolving a NFF
phenomenon. The skilled employee needs no longer to
consider all possibilities, but he can use the classification tree
in advance to exclude options. An option is in this case a set
of values of a parameter or a SuT state. The excluding would 
accelerate sustainable the failure search. Furthermore, the 
classification tree grants an overview over the relevant
parameters and the relationship between them. So, the skilled
employee can check easily whether he has considered all
relevant components (parameters, values) in his inquires.
In other approaches both the structural properties and the
behavior of a SuT are modeled in one model. An example is 
given in Fig. 7
Fig. 7. Example of  a blinker behavior of a car [14]
Fig. 7 illustrates the behavior of a blinker in a car. A blue 
rectangle/node represents a state. In this example, a system
state consists of the current stats, of the left and the right 
blinker. The activity of a blinker is modeled as an integer, in
which the value 0 represents the state for out. A transition
between states is modeled as arrows. An arrow can contain a
constrain, which defines the case for a transition from statei to
statei+1. For example, the blinker can switch from the IDLE
state to the ACTIVE if the value of til is greater than 0. Such 
modeling approaches were researched and resulted in
different modeling language. Common languages are Time
Partition Testing, a UML notation for state machines, a UML
notation for sequence diagrams and so on. The main 
difference to above mentioned approach lies in the fact, that
such kinds of diagrams have their focus on the behavior. A
skilled employee can extract the behavior easily of the model
and get a good overview how the system reacts in a specific
situation. To resolve a NFF phenomenon, the fault state could
be located in such a model. On basis of the located position, a
skilled employee can identify which chain of states had to
occur to reach the fault state. This knowledge is necessary to 
detect faults which have a fault behavior, a trigger and a cause
which occurs at different times. In such a case, the fault
behavior, the trigger and the cause could be found at the worst 
in different states of the behavioral model. The weakness of 
this kind of models lies in the missing overview over the 
relevant parameters and corresponding values. Such kind of 
information is spread over the whole model. Furthermore, the
model is unsuitable when a skilled employee has to identify
whether the measured failure state was covered by the test
models.
To enable an efficient dealing with the model based
knowledge of a test process, the article proposes a two stage
procedure. The procedure is shown in Fig. 8 and could resolve 
a NFF pheromone if the current methods are not sufficient.
Fig. 8. Procedures to resolve a NFF phenomenon with aid of test models
The Fig. 8 depicts a two stage procedure. The first stage is 
on the left side and the second stage is on the right side. The
second stage is only necessary if the detected fault behavior 
can’t be found within the behavirol model. In such a case, the
behaviroal model does not consider all parameters or values.
To find the state, a classification tree can be used. The usage
of a classification tree is the second stage of the procedures.
The search within classification tree clarifies whether the
measured failure state was considered during the test process
or not. This informaiton is a essential information for a test 
engineer. In both cases, the skilled employee has to get in
toach with the test enginners to discuss the impact of the 
search result.
Conclusion
At the beginning of the article the authors presents the
relevance of the NFF phenomenon in the application field of 
avionics. The relevance is given by a rate 50-60% NFF in the
set of detected faults. To reduce the number of NFF, the 
ARINC Workgroup 672 developed a process. This process
was taken and extended with an exchange layer between the
Develop/Production phase and the Operation/Support phase.
The exchange layer serves the exchange of documents from
the Develop/Production phase to the Operation/Support phase. 
It was conclusively justified that the test process could
provide all relevant information to resolve a probably NFF 
phenomenon. The sufficient quality can be guarantee by the
usage of formal models. Models have the advantage that the
save the information formal and enable an automatic access 
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and interpretation to it. Finally, the article defined a procedure 
how the models could be used to resolve possible NFF 
phenomena. The presented procedure has just a vision nature. 
That means, the following issues e.g. are still open 
x It does not consider the concrete process of possible NFF 
analysis. 
x It does not consider the characteristics of a specific 
application domain.  
x The articles didn’t evaluate whether an application domain 
uses both kinds of models for their test process. 
x  The article didn’t evaluate whether the exchange of 
information is technically possible.  
x The article didn’t evaluate which effort would be necessary 
to combine both life-cycle phases. 
The further research should focus on the implementation of 
the mentioned procedure for a concrete application domain. 
This includes the evaluation of a specific NFF analysis and 
the possibilities to integrate the additional information sources 
seamless into the analysis.  
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